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fore the First World War in order to determine who created 
A maintained the pro-Russian policy that culminated In the 
making of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.  A careful 
examination of the Cabinet Papers, the British Documents on 
the Orifin of the War, the memoirs and diaries of the partic- 
ipants, and other primary and secondary sources shows that a 
number of forces and personalities were involved in this in- 
stance of British policy formulation.  The Foreign Secretary, 
the King, the Indian Government, the Foreign Office staff, and 
the India Office, as well as the Committee of Imperial Defence, 
interacted in the context of the often turbulent period, 190*4— 
190?, to gradually produce a consistent and coherent policy that 
favored making an     ment with Rusi  .  Needless to say, 
this was a complex tale to tell, and some attention had to be 
paid to the background of this Anglo-Russian entente.  Other 
issues, such as the significance of the Anglo-Russian Conven- 
tion, the effect of German policy upon the state of Anglo- 
Russian relations, and the implications of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, arise, and are also dealt with in this study.  The 
main point of this thesis, however, is that it was a small 
group of determined Liberal Imperialists, building on a Conser- 
vative Government base, who secured the important posts, si- 
lenced opposition within Britain, and patiently negotiated 
with   the Russians until   they had  signed   the   Convention in 
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I.  Introduction 
Anglo-Russian relations in the last decades of the nine- 
teenth century had been characterized by tension and occasional 
war scares, usually prompted by some action on the part of one 
of the two Powers in Central Asia.  Yet within the first decade 
of the twentieth century these two nations had solved the major 
source of their conflict.  At the same time, many contemporaries 
saw the understanding between the two as a dramatic diplomatic 
maneuver, aimed at encircling Germany, or at least altering the 
balance of power in Europe.  This change in policy came about 
in part by a change in the Russian attitude toward the problem, 
but more because of the British desire for an agreement and 
persistence in seeking that agreement.  This study will exam- 
ine the formulation and maintenance of British foreign policy 
toward Russia in the first decade of the twentieth century to 
determine who creates foreign policy, how they create it, and 
how they maintain their policy as the established one, even in 
times of adverse conditions. 
The elements involved in creating a British policy of 
reconciliation and understanding toward Russia are several. 
Public opinion in Britain was, by and large, suspicious of, 
if not hostile to, Russia even in the best of times,1 and 
difficulties of any nature usually raised storms of protest, 
especially Liberal Party protest, against the last European 
autocratic state.  As will be seen, the Cabinet officers, 
particularly the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, de- 
termined the nation's foreign policy to a large extent.  As 
British policy toward Russia was greatly concerned with India 
and Central Asia, as well as naval and military considerations, 
the India Office, the Admiralty, and the War Office were also 
called upon to aid in the planning and execution of foreign 
policy.  The Government of India, headed by the British Vice- 
roy at Simla, also contributed to the drafting of policy with 
its advice from the scene of many of the Anglo-Russian con- 
frontations.  The King's attitudes and sentiments also had to 
be taken into consideration, for the other rulers of Europe 
gauged British intentions to some extent by what the King 
said and did.2  A last and not unimportant, element was the 
bureaucracy of the Foreign Office.  The sentiments of the am- 
bassadors and the staff colored the reporting of events, thus 
indirectly shaping the course of future policy.  These ele- 
ments are intertwined, and discovering the part that each 
played in the creation and maintenance of British policy to- 
ward Russia is an interesting task. 
The Anglo-Russian Entente has been viewed as a signif- 
icant change of course in European diplomatic history by most 
historians, though the nature and ramifications of the change 
are debatable.  The point of controversy, in general terms, 
is whether or not the Convention of 1907 marked the division 
of Europe into two armed camps, the British, the French, the 
Russians on the one hand, and the Germans and the Austro- 
Hungarians on the other. The men who worked to make the 
agreement did not feel that their efforts were aimed at di- 
viding Europe,3 though Journalists of the time wisely noted 
that Britain was settling her "outstanding differences with 
the rest of the world" in part as a result of the German naval 
challenge,1*' and that Russia and Britain must come to terms in 
Asia "if they desire to act together in Europe."5 A.J.P. 
Taylor, the noted diplomatic historian, sees the Convention 
as being "confined" to Asia, and comments that it was a set- 
tlement of differences, not a "disguised alliance," and that 
only later German actions made the Convention one link in the 
Triple Entente." L.C.B. Seaman, re-evaluating the problem, 
believes that an Anglo-Russian agreement would only be rele- 
vant in Europe, and that an Asian settlement "was the nec- 
essary price to be paid for keeping Russia on the side of the 
French and the English in Europe."7 Regardless of the inter- 
pretation attached to the Anglo-Russian Convention, it marked 
a decided change in the European diplomatic picture, and was 
one more step in the flow of events that led to the First World 
War. 
This example of the process of British policy formulation 
is a particularly valuable one, for it occurs at a time when 
British defense policy was undergoing a complete revision, 
and the Government changed from Conservative to Liberal in the 
election of 1906.  British policy toward Russia demonstrated 
a high degree of continuity, for an understanding with the 
Russians about Central Asia was sought by both the Liberals 
and the Conservatives from 1900 until 1907.  The Foreign Of- 
fice, and key ministers in both Governments pushed for an 
agreement, despite difficulties and setbacks, for they felt 
that such an understanding was necessary in light of the chang- 
ing diplomatic scene in Europe.  Both Governments worked per- 
sistently for a settlement, approaching the problem pragmati- 
cally.  In the final analysis the Anglo-Russian Convention 
of 1907 was the product of the efforts of a small group of men 
in key positions within the British Government, who were able 
to silence or override their opposition in order to achieve a 
goal they deemed necessary for the good of Britain.  There- 
fore, the main emphasis of this study will be upon the cre- 
ation of British foreign policy; the motives and intentions 
of Russian policy will not be examined in depth, though they 
will be presented to show the differences between the Rus- 
sian motives and the British perception of them. 
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II. Britain, Russia, and Japan, 1900-1904 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century British 
statesmen and diplomats guided Britain through the maze of 
international Dolitics by pursuing a policy that became 
known as "Splendid Isolation".  The policy worked out well 
for the British during that period.  The Empire expanded, 
British trade boomed, and England did not become involved in 
continental wars or alliance systems.  By 1901, however, the 
policy of isolation was less than splendid, and attempts were 
made by the British diplomats to settle some of the old quar- 
rels that Britain had with her European neighbors.  The pol- 
icy of Russian expansion in Central and Eastern Asia had 
brought that Power into conflict with English interests in 
China and Central Asia.  The Russian threat to Persia, Af- 
ghanistan, and Tibet created much unrest in the minds of 
British diplomats and military men, for these areas were ad- 
jacent to the great and vital British holdings in India.  The 
Conservative Government, headed by Lord Salisbury and later 
Sir Arthur Balfour, realized that a Central Asian settlement 
with Russia would relieve the greatest source of Russian dip- 
lomatic pressure on Britain.  Overtures were made to the 
Russians, but to no avail; Russian imperialism was reaching 
its high-water mark, and the British, operating partly in fear 
of the Russians, had little to offer in making a settlement. 
As events on the diplomatic scene became increasingly com- 
plex, and the threat of a Russo-Japanese War began to loom 
large, the situation began to look better for the British, 
but the first three years of the new century saw no great sur- 
face change in Anglo-Russian relations. 
Britain's emergence from her "Splendid Isolation" was 
done gradually and reluctantly.  Events in Europe had pre- 
occupied the other Powers from the 1850's until the l870's, 
and the competition for empire that began in the l8?0's fur- 
ther diverted attention from Britain itself.  During this 
time Britain had gone her own way, by and large, and had es- 
tablished her "Second Empire".  Increasingly, however, the 
French, Germans, and Russians had begun to intrude into areas 
that the British claimed as their own.  Russian expansion 
aimed at Central Asia and the Far East, threatened India and 
British trade and loans with China.  Germany was also a pow- 
erful commercial threat in China, and her rapidly expanding 
industry and commerce were beginning to undercut British 
goods at home and abroad by 1900.  Though the Fashoda Crisis 
of 1898 had thrown cold water on French colonial aspirations 
in Central Africa, there was still considerable friction be- 
tween France and England in both North Africa and the Far 
East in 1900.  Thus, beset from almost all sides, Britain's 
days as an isolated Power appeared to be numbered as the 
twentieth century began. 
The Boer War produced a further deterioration in the 
British situation. While British manpower and money were 
absorbed in South Africa, the French seized some territory 
on the contested Moroccan-Algerian border, and the Russians 
advanced their interests in Persia by making the government of 
that nation a loan on the condition that Persia borrow only 
from Russia for the next ten years.  At the same time the 
Russians occupied Manchuria as a result of the Boxer Re- 
bellion, thus threatening the integrity of the feeble Chinese 
Empire.  If these assaults upon the Empire and British pre- 
dominance were not enough, the war against the Boer Republics 
revealed that the Regular Army was too small for British im- 
perial commitments, and sorely lacking both training and equip- 
ment.  Still more startling was the Admiralty pronouncement 
early in 1901, that the British Mediterranean Fleet was no 
longer strong enough to oppose the combination of the Rus- 
sian Black Sea Fleet and the French Mediterranean Fleet.2 A 
re-examination of military and naval planning and procedure was 
certainly in order, but even more important, though perhaps 
less obvious, was the need to formulate a new foreign policy 
that would provide Britain with allies, so that she would not 
have to arm herself against all Europe. 
The British Foreign Office moved slowly, almost casu- 
ally, toward some type of alliance and understanding that 
would solve at least some of her problems.  Despite the de- 
sire to make some kind of settlement with Russia, the Brit- 
ish were unable to make any gains with that Power.  Anglo- 
German talks resulted in the China Agreement of 1900, by 
which Britain and Germany agreed to maintain the integrity 
of China.  The Agreement amounted to little, as it broke down 
in 1901 in the face of Russian and Japanese pressure on China 
and Manchuria. The Germans did not wish to enforce the Agree- 
ment for fear of alienating Russia, while Britain was not a- 
bout to support the Triple Alliance against Russia, because, 
as Salisbury had said in 1886, "we are fish" - the British 
Navy could do precious little for Austria-Hungary or East Prus- 
sia.3 Anglo-German talks continued until the end of 1901, but, 
despite their best efforts, the Anglophiles in Germany and 
the Germanophiles in England could not come to terms.  Ger- 
man suspicion and reluctance drove the British into the arms 
of the Japanese. 
Seeking some resolution to the Far Eastern problem, the 
British replied to Japanese overtures made late in 1901.  The 
British Foreign Office, headed by Lord Lansdowne, knew that 
the Japanese were seeking an alliance or understanding in St. 
Petersburg as much as in London.  Lansdowne had been rebuffed 
in his attempt to deal directly with the Russians, and feared 
that if he did not quickly come to terms with the Japanese, he 
would have to face a Russo-Japanese coalition in China.  Ger- 
man enthusiasm over the China Agreement had long ago waned, 
so Lansdowne felt that he had a free hand to deal with the 
Japanese.  An Anglo-Japanese Alliance would negate the need 
for a German understanding, or so Lansdowne felt, and thus 
the British vigorously pursued the Japanese offer.  A mutu- 
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al assistance pact, stating that help would be given if 
either party were attacked in the Far East by two other Pow- 
ers, resulted after three months of negotiation.  Sir Arthur 
Balfour, the new Prime Minister, had feared that "We may 
find ourselves fighting for our own existence in every part 
of the globe against Russia and France because France has 
joined forces with her ally over some obscure Russo-Japa- 
nese quarrel in Corea."^ The old idea of isolation did not 
die easily, and even Lansdowne had some qualms about the new 
alliance.  There was no better alternative at the time, how- 
ever, and, as 1902 passed quietly in China, the British came 
to feel that they had found their Far Eastern soldier, and 
gotten it at what seemed to be an inexpensive price.5 
Britain might not have become directly involved in con- 
tinental affairs by the Japanese Alliance, but the agreement 
did have a pronounced effect upon the course of European di- 
plomacy, for a Russo-Japanese War could place the French in 
a bad position.  Russia the French needed for security against 
Germany, yet a peaceful and friendly Great Britain was also 
necessary.  Throughout 1902 Delcasse, the French Foreign Min- 
ister, tinkered with his problem to little effect; there seem- 
ed no way to approach Britain without alienating Russia, who 
always came first with the French.  In the meantime events 
worked in the French minister's favor. 
Late in 1902 many members of the British Foreign Office 
came to feel that Germany was not necessary to British policy 
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in many instances, and that the German Government and mil- 
itary organization even harbored a certain malevolence a- 
galnst them.  When the Straits question arose in regard to 
Russia sending torpedo boats into the Black Sea, the Foreign 
Office and the Committee of Imperial Defence surveyed the 
situation, and decided that consultations with Germany were 
not necessary to decide this issue.  Further, in October, 1902, 
the Admiralty came to the realization that the German Navy 
was designed for use against Britain, and Britain alone.  The 
"risk fleet" then being created by Admiral Tirpitz through 
the Naval Law of 1898 was not meant to face a concentrated 
British Navy, but rather was to serve as a diplomatic weapon 
with which the Germans could threaten Britain.  This factor, 
combined with a growing German commercial and industrial ri- 
valry, turned British interests away from Germany.  A grow- 
ing anti-German element in the Foreign Office and the Admiral- 
ty began to direct British attention toward the benefits of 
understandings with France and Russia. 
Unable to deal with Russia, and by 1902, unwilling to 
deal with Germany, the Foreign Office sought an understanding 
with France.  As the Asian situation became increasingly tense 
in 1903, the British realized that their position was quite 
similar to that of the French, and to prevent problems from 
arising, the two Powers would have to act together then. 
Once conversations began, both nations saw the chance to end 
their colonial problems, not only in North Africa, but in 
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Siam and Newfoundland as well.  Negotiations began in July, 
1903, and proceeded quickly and smoothly.  Though only co- 
lonial matters were discussed in concrete terms, both parties 
had other considerations in mind, and a steadily deteriorating 
Par Eastern situation kept the discussions moving apace.  In 
the end France accepted control of Morocco, while conceding 
control of Egypt to the British.  Other colonial and commercial 
matters were also resolved, and the Entente Cordiale was sign- 
ed April 8, 1904. 
The Entente was not the long-term goal of either Power 
nor was it even the product of a concerted plan; rather, it 
was a product of the times, reflecting the changing diplomatic 
problems that each nation faced.  Both sides gained from the 
colonial settlements, and, hopefully, reduced the chance of 
extending the Russo-Japanese War, begun in February, 1904, to 
Europe.  "The entente was essential for France,"  for if a sec- 
ond party entered the war against Russia, the French felt 
obligated to come to Russia's aid.  The British were obligated 
to come into action if a second Power attacked Japan, and be- 
ing on good terms with France was insurance against spreading 
the war.  The Entente by no means solved all the French prob- 
lems, but it helped considerably.  By 1904, the British had 
ended their isolation, solved some of their colonial problems 
and protected their Far Eastern interests with the Japanese 
Alliance, all without choosing sides in Europe.  An anti- 
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German attitude was growing in the Foreign Office, and with 
this came an increasing desire to improve relations with 
Russia. 
Anglo-Russian relations in the last quarter of the nine- 
teenth century were influenced to a large extent by the course 
of Russian expansion in central Asia.  Problems with Turkey, 
the Balkans, the Straits, Manchuria, China and Korea all af- 
fected the diplomacy of the two Powers, but it was in Central 
Asia that the Russians made the greatest gains at the least 
cost, and it was from this area that the most direct threat 
to the British Empire was posed, or so the Governments of 
India and Whitehall felt.  The Balkans cooled down after the 
l880's when the Russian attention turned elsewhere.  British 
diplomats could protest Russian Par Eastern adventures, but 
it was difficult to get too excited about them, as only com- 
mercial, not territorial, claims were at stake.  India, however, 
was deemed vital to British interests, and any Russian move 
to dominate the neighboring territories was looked upon with 
suspicion and hostility. 
The Russian policy of expansion into Central Asia was 
an ongoing one, begun in the mid-eighteenth century as the 
steppe country was brought under St. Petersburg's control. 
The process of conquest began in earnest in the 1860's, 
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however, when the Russian government came to realize that gains 
in the region might profit them quite handily.  Not only were 
markets for Russian manufactured goods opened, and sources of 
raw cotton obtained, but certain diplomatic advantages were 
gained as well, for the military came to feel that their pre- 
sence in Central Asia put them in the gateway to India, thus 
giving Russian diplomats a significant lever against the British. 
Aided by the Russian government's inability to control the gen- 
erals in the field, new territory was added to the Empire with 
increasing frequency.  The first inroads were made in 1864 with 
joining of the West Siberian and Syr-Daria lines of fortresses 
on the borders of the Moslem khanates.''' The fall of Tashkent 
committed the Russians to absorb the oases, and Samarkand fell 
in 1868.  The khanates of Bukhara and Khiva were under Rus- 
sian control by 1873, and   Kckand was annexed in 1876.  These 
additions to Russian territory did not go unnoticed in Britain, 
but no protest was lodged.  Later annexations, closer to India, 
drew hot responses from the British, and the taking of Merv, 
on the Persian border, in 1884 produced a major crisis and a 
serious threat of war the next year.  Occupation of these lands 
made the British nervous enough; the threat, or supposed threat, 
created by the building of railroads, such as the Transcaspian 
line, into these areas stimulated British military thinkers to 
new heights of hysteria.  By the mid-1890's, British military 
thinking concerned itself almost exclusively with the problem 
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of defending Jd*^" India, and the Northwest Frontier in partic- 
ular. °     Russian attempts to influence the governments of Af- 
ghanistan and Persia, or Russian intervention in China or Tibet 
furthered British distrust, and stimulated jingoistic talk by 
both Whitehall and the British government in India.  Though 
there were few major crises after the mid-1890's, any move by 
either the Russians or the British to send a trade delegation 
or to influence the native governments created an instant, if 
minor, crisis, and the period is marked by scores of such 
events.^ The Central Asian feud was one of the oldest and long- 
est quarrels between the two nations, and the one with perhaps 
the least foundation in fact. 
The Russian dream, and the British fear, of Russian ar- 
mies invading India from Persia or Afghanistan was, and still 
is, a difficult, if not impossible, task.  The terrain is quite 
rough, and in the early days of the twentieth century the nec- 
essary supply lines would have been too long to be practical. 
The British military planners ran into several logistical prob- 
lems when they contemplated war on the Northwest Frontier, and 
it never seemed to occur to them that the Russians would face 
the same, if not worse, problems.10 Thus, one of the greatest 
bones of contention between the two Powers was, at that time, 
little more than a figment of the imagination. 
However, it was this tender Central Asian situation that 
eventually brought an accord between Britain and Russia.  Britain, 
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no longer expansionist  in Asia, and seeking to end her dip- 
lomatic isolation, undertook to achieve some understanding 
with Russia, beginning in 1899 under Salisbury's ministry. At 
this time, however, Russian foreign policy was working well 
in the Far East, and a Central Asian settlement would be of 
little use to the Russian government, as it would only preclude 
or hinder future Russian actions in the area.  The Russian 
situation with regard to Persia was quite good at the turn of 
the century; so good in fact, that Baron Curzon, the Viceroy 
to India, feared a Russian advance into that state at any 
moment.11  In 1900 the Russians loaned the Persian government 
a sum of money on the condition that the Persians borrow only 
from Russia for the next ten years.  At the height of the Boer 
War, in 1901, Russian pressure on the government of Afghanistan 
was increased, and a Russian subsidy was granted to a steam- 
boat company in the Persian gulf.  These acts created a stir 
not only in Simla, but Whitehall as well.  Members of the Brit- 
ish government felt that moves into Persia were designed to 
open the easier western invasion route to India, and that the 
establishment of a Russian naval base on the Persian gulf would 
threaten the communications between India and England.12 Tenta- 
tive Russian commercial and diplomatic overtures to Afghanistan 
and Tibet, made late in 1901, upset Simla further, for even if 
no invasion followed the Russian penetration of those regions, 
they were areas from which Russians agents could work to upset 
the Indian borderlands or start local wars.13 By late 19OI, 
17 
many British diplomats felt the same way about Russia that 
the Viceroy did:  that Russian ambition knew no bounds, and 
that Britain must "defend that which she has won, and ... 
resist the minor encroachments which are only a part of the 
larger plan."14" Furthermore, many British officials realized 
the strength of the Russian position, and the weakness of Brit- 
ain's.  The Russians were on the offensive in Asia, and the 
British could make no good offer for a settlement that would 
placate the Russians.  Thus, all talks in 1900-1901 proved 
abortive. 
The year 1902 opened with a British coup against the 
Russians in the form of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.  The Rus- 
sians quite rightly interpreted this agreement as a diplomatic 
victory for the British, and were quick to see that it was 
aimed directly at them.  A Franco-Russian note, which for all 
intents and purposes extended the Dual Alliance to cover any 
Asian situation, quickly followed the announcement of the An- 
glo-Japanese Alliance.  In the summer of that year, Russian 
pressure was again applied to Persia, and it appeared that the 
Russians had regained their lost momentum. Lord Hamilton, the 
Secretary of State for India, wrote that "in this Office and 
the Foreign Office I think Persia is the one question which 
more constantly occupies the official mind than any other sub- 
ject connected with foreign politics.nl&    Afghanistan, too, seem- 
ed to be slipping under Russian domination, and it was felt that 
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the ruler, the Ameer, was dealing with the Russians on the 
sly.1''' The Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), in one of 
the last meetings of the year, added yet more gloom to the 
picture, noting that the completion of the Orenburg-Tashkent 
railroad was expected by 1905, thus adding more danger to 
1 R the already precarious situation in Central Asia.   It had 
been hoped that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would check the 
Russians in the Far East, and give them pause in Central Asia. 
As 1902 closed the Russians were still pushing in China, 
Manchuria, and Korea, and the Central Asian pause had been 
short indeed.  Clearly, some settlement was needed, especial- 
ly in Central Asia where British interests appeared most 
threatened, to halt any Anglo-Russian dispute before it evolved 
into a major crisis. 
The Conservative Cabinet, headed by Balfour, was very 
cautious with regard to any forward policy toward Russia. 
The British had little to offer the Russians, and did not 
wish a confrontation or war. The Russian matter troubled 
the Cabinet, but no solution appeared to be forthcoming. 
Caution and care were the words of the hour, so much so that 
the aggressive Hamilton wrote Curzon that "if it [the Cabinetj 
was put to the vote, there would be a disposition to abandon 
all our present obligations, and to substitute nothing in 
their place except an attempt to come to an understanding 
with Russia."19 
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The renewed British attempt to deal with Russia in 1903 
appeared to meet with little success.  The Tsar and a small 
clique of aggressive imperialists, including Alexander 
Bezobrazov, the Privy Councillor, Plehve, the Minister of the 
Interior, and two high-ranking navy men,20 controlled foreign 
policy, and pushed for expansion not only in Central Asia, but 
in the Far East as well.  Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, 
issued strong warnings to Benckendorff, the Russian ambassador 
in London, concerning the Persian situation. The activities 
of Russian agents in Tibet did not escape Lansdowne's notice 
either, and this matter called for another conversation with 
the ambassador.2   A strong speech in Parliament, aimed against 
the Russian idea of creating a Russian port on the Persian Gulf, 
was also intended to warn the Russians against further advances. 
The CID also examined the Indian situation, and decided that, 
though the Russians would probably make no overt moves until 
their rail lines extended to the frontier, the army in India 
was by no means large enough or well enough equipped to defend 
the area.2^  Despite all the warnings and injunctions to the 
Russians, Lansdowne was talking privately to Benckendorff in 
different terms and in a different tone. 
The surface appearance of little success in the Anglo- 
Russian talks was misleading, for Lansdowne and Benckendorff 
had made some significant steps toward real conversations and 
an agreement.  Retrenchment was the Cabinet policy in 1903, and 
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in the face of rising naval spending, the Army estimates 
were cut.  The Cabinet, thus gave its blessing to any Anglo- 
Russian overtures of peace in hopes of preventing a costly 
2k war or having to spend more on the Indian Army.   The quiet 
settlement of a Tibetan problem in April, 1903, and a change 
in the Straits policy on the part of the CID both helped 
friendly relations. "  The failure of the Baghdad Railway 
talks introduced the fear of German intervention in Persia, 
and spurred on the informal talks.  The Russians were open 
and attentive in these low-key negotiations in the first half 
of 1903, though they were not ready to enter full-scale con- 
versations yet.2" Just when it appeared that some gains might 
be made, the situation in the Far East came to a head, and all 
but wiped out the slender gains made in three years of at- 
tempted negotiations. 
The Far Eastern crisis was precipitated by the failure 
of the Russians to withdraw their troops from Manchuria, as 
they had earlier promised, and the Russian advance into Korea 
through the Yalu River timber concessions.  The forward Russian 
policy had pushed the Japanese hard, and these two events 
aroused the Japanese government's anger.  The Japanese felt that 
the Russian presence in Manchuria and Korea was a threat to 
their sphere of influence.  Russo-Japanese negotiations to set- 
tle the matter proved futile, and the Japanese soon approached 
the British, asking what the British were prepared to do for 
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their ally.2? The British Foreign Office was in quite a 
strain, and to try to ease the situation Lansdovme approached 
the French.  The British did not wish to renig on their ally, 
yet they did not want to sacrifice their Russian talks or have 
to go to war in Europe because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 
A settlement with France would hopefully preclude any chance 
of a European war, and smooth over Anglo-Russian relations as 
well.  Thus, in October, 1903, Lansdowne called upon Delcasse 
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to pave the way for further Anglo-Russian talks. '  The French 
were amenable, but the Russians, now feeling that Britain would 
go to Japan's aid, were having no part of the British overtures. 
Reluctantly Lansdowne aided the Japanese in the fall of 1903, 
in order "to convince Russia that she could not safely con- 
tinue to flout us ...."30 Though Anglo-Russian talks were not 
broken off, no progress of any kind was made in the final months 
of the year.  The British effort to dissuade the two Powers 
from going to war never got started, and in February, 1904, the 
Japanese attacked the Russian Far Eastern bases, opening the 
Russo-Japanese War. 
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The British government and Foreign Office realized in 
the first years of the twentieth century that some alterations 
were needed in the area of foreign policy, and that the old 
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policy of isolation was no longer feasible at all.  Russia 
was the one Power with whom England had had almost constant 
trouble since the mid-18001s, and it was here that the Foreign 
Office first tried to make some agreement.  The talks begun 
by Salisbury in 1899 bore no real fruit in the first years of 
the century, however.  The Russian policy was one of expansion 
in both the Far East and Central Asia.  The British Cabinet 
feared Russian aggressiveness in Central Asia, but could find 
no way to combat it.  Naval building programs took the lion's 
share of the defense budget after the Boer War, leaving few 
funds to increase or improve the Indian Army.  At the same time, 
the Foreign Office and the India Office could find nothing to 
use to strike a bargain with the Russians.  The British did 
make some progress in ending their isolation.  The Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance of 1902 theoretically checked the Russians 
in the Far East and protected British interests there, while 
permitting the Admiralty to strengthen the Home and Mediter- 
ranean Fleets with withdrawals from the Pacific Fleet.  The 
British did not intend to give up hope of an Anglo-Russian 
agreement though, and continued talks throughout 1902 and 1903. 
As tensions in the Far East increased in the latter year, the 
British found it much to their advantage to cultivate the 
French, and did so with much vigor, until they had signed an 
entente with her. 
The Anglo-Russian negotiations, if they may be called 
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such, of the period 1900-1903 characterize the persistence 
and patience with which the British Foreign Office pursued 
the Russians in the following years, as well as demonstrating 
the pragmatic attitude of the British diplomats.  An under- 
standing with Bussia about Central Asia would have been a 
great boor, to the military men by eliminating one of their 
greatest fears.  Military spending could be cut, and, as the 
German naval threat emerged, this consideration became even 
more important.  Further, an understanding with Russia would 
help end the old policy of isolation, which was proving to be 
increasingly expensive and dangerous.  Few of the British 
ministers at first favored an agreement with Russia, for though 
it might be necessary, Britain had little to offer the Russians 
in any sort of settlement.  The Russian position at the begin- 
ning of the century was a strong one.  Though Balfour and 
Lansdowne reluctantly favored a settlement of some type, the 
majority of the Cabinet and concerned officials, such as 
Hamilton and Curzon favored arming against Russia rather than 
making a settlement.  The years 1900 to 1903 saw the British 
position grow stronger with the alliance with Japan, and the 
beginnings of Anglo-French talks.  The Russian situation de- 
teriorated somewhat during the same period, as the Japanese 
began to move to check Russian expansion in the Far East. 
Furthermore, the increasing need for retrenchment by the 
British made the idea of an Anglo-Russian agreement more 
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palatable to the Cabinet, if only for the savings in Indian 
Army expenses.  The early lack of success did not deter British 
diplomats, for the subject was kept open to discussion at all 
times.  The coming of the Russo-Japanese War created a sus- 
picion of Britain in the minds of the Russians, but the war 
itself, and the problems that followed, caused a change in the 
Russian attitude toward Britain and Central Asia. 
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III.  Britain, Russia, and Germany, 190*4-1905 
The Russo-Japanese War and the failure of the Germans 
to obtain a Russo-German Alliance at Bjorko in 1905 led to 
the making of the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907.  The 
British Foreign Office still wanted an understanding with 
Russia during the war, and kept the lines of communication 
open.  Unfortunate incidents, such as the Younghusband Mission 
and the Dogger Bank Incident, had an adverse effect upon Anglo- 
Russian relations, but Lansdowne and the Foreign Office man- 
aged to keep the situation cool, so that relations were never 
broken off.  It was during the period of the war that the 
British government debated the matter of Anglo-Russian rela- 
tions, and by 1906 had decided, by and large, in favor of 
making some type of settlement with Russia.  An anti-German 
and pro-French and Russian attitude came to pervade the Foreign 
Office, further accelerating the British efforts to achieve a 
settlement.  By 1906 the only real opposition to a Russian con- 
vention came from Simla, and the Foreign Office saw the prob- 
lem more in terms of working out the agreement than convincing 
the Cabinet and the public of the necessity of such an agree- 
ment. 
The coming of the Russo-Japanese War in February, 1904, 
had a dampening effect upon the casual talks that Benckendorff 
and Lansdowne had been having. Lansdowne was quite pleased 
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that the Russians were willing to talk about the Asian situ- 
ation, * and was encouraged by Benckendorff*s claim that "the 
moment was riper now for a friendly understanding than at any 
time during the past twenty years."2 Such statements, however, 
could have little effect when it was realized that the am- 
bassador had no authority to make specific proposals at that 
time,3 and it appeared that the Russians were waiting to see 
what Japan's next move might be.  Thus, though talks about 
Central Asia continued, and Lansdowne circulated a Cabinet 
memorandum on Anglo-Russian relations, which called for crit- 
icism,^ little of importance was accomplished early in 190^. 
The immediate Foreign Office and Cabinet reaction to the 
war, as far as Russian relations were concerned, was one of 
relief.  The prevalent idea was that a Russian war with Japan 
might bring the Russians around to the point of considering 
some serious talks with the British.5 Anglo-Russian relations 
did not improve immediately, however, because the Russians felt 
that the British had pushed Japan into a war.   The Cabinet 
became uneasy about the Russian situation when it learned that 
more Russian troops were appearing on the Central Asian borders 
as the result of Russian mobilization, and that a concerted ef- 
fort had completed the Orenburg-Tashkent railway almost a year 
ahead of the CID estimate.7  Anglo-French negotiations for the 
Entente were progressing well, and Delcasse aided, to some 
Q 
extent, in reconciling the Russians and the British.   The 
Russians were still quite bitter toward the British in March, 
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1904, though, and the Cabinet realized that some effort would 
have to be made to soothe the Russian anger, if talks were to 
continue on even the earlier modest scale. 
It was at this point, in April and May, 1904, that the 
confusion, division, and indecision about British policy to- 
ward Russia manifested itself.  On April Ik,   King Edward VII, 
who at this time favored a rapprochement with Russia, met in 
Copenhagen with Alexander Izvolsky, the Russian ambassador 
to Denmark.  A lengthy discussion on the relations of the two 
countries marked a first step toward better relations. The 
King declared that he wanted an entente with Russia, similar 
to the one just concluded with France, for that "had always 
been and continues to be the object of my most sincere desires."9 
The debate within the Cabinet and the Foreign Office continued 
as before, however.  On April 22, Balfour circulated a con- 
fidential memorandum that examined the Russian influence in 
Persia, noting that Russia did not want the annexation of 
Persia, only ascendency in that region.  Again the fear that 
Russian agents in Persia might make British India "scarcely 
tenable" was expressed, and the paper concluded that a Rus- 
sian advance could be halted only by the British building rail- 
roads and ports in the country.10 The same day though, Charles 
Hardinge, King Edward's choice as the new ambassador to Russia, 
wrote Edward that if Britain wished to be on Russia's good 
side, some gesture, such as "an unopposed passage" of the 
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Straits by the Black Sea Fleet "might prove a very useful as- 
set in the event of the general negotiations for an arrange- 
ment with Russia being resumed.1111  Lord Kitchener, the commander 
of the Indian Army, continued to espouse an aggressive policy 
against Russia in Central Asia, and opposed any talks with that 
Power.  Lansdowne had found a temporary ally in the King, 
who, having decided upon a friendly policy, was firm with 
Kitchener, stating that only one policy would come from White- 
hall.  Further, a letter to the Tsar, dated May 12, 1904, 
stated the King's desire to make a "satisfactory settlement" 
and a "lasting agreement" with Russia.12 
By late spring, 1904, Anglo-Russian relations were in 
a state of some confusion.  The Russians, heavily engaged in 
the war against Japan, distrusted the British, and did not 
appear at all anxious to begin talks.  The British, for their 
part, took an ambivalent stand.  On the one hand, the King, 
Lansdowne, the new ambassador to Russia, Sir Charles Hardinge, 
and some of the Foreign Office men, desired a settlement, and 
worked for some type of rapprochement.  At the same time a 
deep-seated fear and distrust of Russia prompted the Indian 
government, under Curzon, many military men, such as Kitchener, 
and the CID to plan for war on the Northwest Frontier, and to 
call for more military spending.  Balfour, typified the inde- 
cision by his actions in 1904.  In January he had circulated 
a memorandum favoring an agreement with Russia; in April he 
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proposed moving into south and central Persia before the 
Russians did, as mentioned above; later, in August he would 
change tack again, stating that a Russian invasion of India 
was "a scare of the most foolish description.M13 The French 
entente had little effect on Anglo-Russian relations, and it 
remained for the two Powers to start their own conversations. 
The British Foreign Office worked diligently to cultivate 
the Russians during the summer of 1904. News of a German at- 
tempt to conclude an alliance with Russia circulated through 
Europe shortly after the signing of the Anglo-French agree- 
ment, and the British worked closely with the French to block 
such a move.  Further, everything possible was done not to 
anger the Russians.  Problems with contraband articles and 
maritime rights were soft-pedaled, while the Japanese request 
that the British oppose any attempt of the Black Sea Fleet 
to run the Straits was carefully ignored, and no reply sent. 
Peace and calm were the objects of British policy, and 
Lansdowne wrote that "the more quietly we can proceed, the 
better ... and we must blacken their [the RussiansjJ faces as 
little as possible. B14 
Unfortunately, events did not go along that smoothly. 
In January, 1904, the younghusband Mission had left India 
for Tibet to negotiate the settlement of various trade and 
border problems.  When no Tibetan negotiator arrived at the 
pre-arranged site of the talks, Curzon and other members of 
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the India Office proposed that the expedition go on to Lhasa, 
the capital, to find someone able to speak for the Tibetan 
government.  Younghusband's orders were to negotiate a settle- 
ment incorporating a modest indemnity to be paid to the British 
over a three year period. The emissary's actions went far be- 
yond his orders, for he occupied Lhasa, and forced a large in- 
demnity on the Tibetans with payments lasting for seventy-five 
years.  The Russians had reluctantly agreed to the original 
plan, but were quite upset with what transpired, not only be- 
cause of the high-handed method, but also because they felt 
that the British were attempting to take over this neutral ter- 
ritory.  Thus, the actions of Younghusband in September, 1904, 
destroyed the whole summer's campaign to placate the Russians. 
Younghusband's actions were perhaps motivated in part by 
the Indian government's fear of Russians in Tibet.  Simla 
felt that unfriendly agents there would exploit Tibetan gold3 
sap at the important recruiting of Gurkha natives into the 
Indian Army, and call for the strengthening of Nepal. 5 These 
factors, combined with the fear of Russian penetration into 
Persia and Afghanistan, may have prompted the Indian govern- 
ment to attempt a coup in Tibet.  Whatever the reason, the 
storm that followed made the attempt vain and useless.  The 
Russians were angry,16 but Lansdowne and Balfour were so irate 
that it seemed for a time as if heads would roll.  Balfour 
made it clear to Curzon that the Viceroy could not make his 
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own foreign policy, and that such attempts would only lead to 
severe difficulties.1''' After some debate, the Younghusband 
Treaty was modified in several important respects, and the 
other Powers, especially China and Russia, were mollified, 
and the revised treaty was approved by an unhappy Curzon on 
1 R November 11, 1904.   At this same time the Russians became 
increasingly preoccupied with the war, and all talks about 
Central Asia were halted until January, 1905. 
In the meantime a worse crisis arose when the Russian 
Baltic Fleet, sailing through the North Sea on its way to the 
Far East, fired on a fleet of British fishing vessels on the 
Dogger Bank.  The Russians, who had felt themselves the vic- 
tims of British actions, now found the tables turned.  The 
British were now the injured party, and British public opinion 
was aroused greatly because of the incident.  Despite numer- 
ous Russian attempts to explain the problem, many official re- 
grets and apologies, as well as offers of indemnities,1'  the 
British public and many government officers were looking for 
blood.  The Cabinet members who had supported Lansdowne's try 
at a Russian entente had done so out of fear of Russia; now, 
with British honor insulted, they became hawks.20 The Cabinet 
kept an eye on the offending fleet, and read such papers as 
"Disposition of Ships to Prevent Russian Baltic Fleet from 
Reaching the Far East."21  Both the Indian Army and government 
were upset by the incident, and feared war in the immediate 
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future.22 Though tempers flared and nerves were strained, 
cooler heads prevailed, and a settlement was eventually made 
without resorting to war.  The incident caused a serious rupture 
in Anglo-Russian relations late in 1904, but had no long-term 
adverse effects. 
This crisis did demonstrate the continued division of the 
British policy makers.  The Russians were genuinely upset 
and apologetic after the incident, making as many peaceful of- 
fers and gestures as they could.  Lansdowne still desired an 
entente, but the Cabinet and the Prime Minister kept the air 
filled with war rhetoric, making it difficult to negotiate a 
quick, peaceful settlement.2^ The King, too, felt that Rus- 
sia "could not accept such a humiliation" as the British press 
and public demanded, and that a war with Russia "for the sake 
of the heirs of two harmless fishermen" would be a "dire 
calamity."24 Surprisingly, Lord Fisher, the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, and a jingo on most such matters, still favored an 
alliance with Russia, feeling that a war with Germany was in- 
evitable. 25 The French, now caught between the two conflicting 
parties, did what they could to restore peace and harmony,26 
though good relations were achieved only with the passage of 
time. 
The end of 1904 and early 1905 saw no new crises in 
Anglo-Russian relations; indeed, as the Younghusband Mission 
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and the Dogger Bank Incident passed into history, and as more 
Russian troops were withdrawn from Central Asia, the British 
began to feel somewhat relieved.  The Russians could feel no 
relief whatsoever though, for their situation was going from 
bad to worse.  Defeats in the field humiliated her, while no 
decision could be reached in regard to the German overtures 
made during the winter of 19C4-1905.  Port Arthur fell on Jan- 
uary 2, 1905; Bloody Sunday and strike and rebellion quickly 
followed, and in March the Russian Army was shattered at Mukden, 
The French, fearing the collapse of Russia, and thus of their 
check against Germany, became frantic in the spring of 1905, 
but found no consolation in the British, who saw only the 
benefits of a Russian failure.  These benefits included a 
quiet Asia and an amenable Russia.2'''  By the end of March, the 
Foreign Office was feeling quite smug, for Russia, beaten in 
an Asian war by an ally of Britain, would be willing to deal 
with the British, while their new partner, France, looked on 
with pleasure.  The Germans were disturbed at this prospect, 
and decided to test the British where they felt they were 
weakest, the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale.  Thus, the 
Moroccan Crisis came to occupy the attention of European dip- 
lomats throughout 1905, and into 1906, while the often frus- 
trated Anglo-Russian talks languished in the back parlors of 
the embassies. 
As the Russo-Japanese War drew to its close, the British 
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again took a look at their position and responsibilities in 
Asia, and the old suspicions of Russia came out again.  Army 
reform was in the air, and one of the chief aims of the in- 
novators was to create a mobile force ready to go where needed 
"especially on the N.W. frontier of India."28 The Army Plan- 
ning Section was still obsessed with India, and each year the 
maneuvers "strove to recreate the atmosphere of the North-West 
Frontier, as if there were no Entente Cordiale and war with 
Russia were the ever-present danger," while the Staff College 
continued to tour the Snowdon region "to illustrate the 
peculiarities of hill warfare on the North-West Frontier of 
India."2^  CID papers continued to examine the problems of war 
in the mountains, discussing the relative merits of the use of 
mules as opposed to camels for pack animals, noting that 23^,79^ 
camels would be needed to supply a given force in the event of 
war.30 Many, including Kitchener, feared Russian activity in 
Seistan in the northwest, feeling that even in 1905 a "forward 
adventurous policy was in the ascendent  "3  The British, 
occupied with renewing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and re- 
assuring the French over the Moroccan issue, had little to do 
with the peace conference at Portsmouth, and passed up an ex- 
cellent chance to aid Russia. When President Roosevelt called 
upon the British to apply pressure to the Japanese, Lansdowne 
noted that "our advice would not be taken and would be resent- 
ed," and that Balfour would have to be consulted as to "the 
course to be taken."32 Thus, nothing was done, and the oppor- 
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tunity passed. 
British policy throughout the war had shown a great 
degree of fluctuation.  The war had at first been greeted with 
some joy by Whitehall.  It had accelerated the French talks, 
and created, at least in part, a mutually beneficial settlement 
with that country.  Further, both London and Simla felt that 
such a war would sap at Russian strength in Central Asia, and 
perhaps a defeat would make the Russians anxious for an agree- 
ment with Britain.  However, no firm policy guidelines seemed 
to prevail, and relations went from cool to warm to cool again. 
In April, 1904, the King made ostentatious gestures of friend- 
ship, while Balfcur, the Cabinet, and the Indian Army and gov- 
ernment considered &.  forward policy against Russia. Lansdowne 
decreed that the Russians should not be pushed or bothered, and 
the Younghusband Mission announced that Tibet was all but a 
British protectorate.  Furthermore, just as the Dogger Bank In- 
cident was blowing over, and relations had a chance to improve, 
the British renewed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and extended 
it to India, while passing up a good chance to aid Russia at 
the peacetable. 
The renewal of the Japanese Alliance showed the reluctance 
of many British statesmen to break with "old" policies, as well 
as demonstrating the influence of the military upon the forma- 
tion of foreign policy.  Charles a'Court Repington, military 
correspondent for the London Times, had long advocated strong 
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action in Central Asia, even to building British railways into 
Kabul.3  Repington was a public sounding board for the Army, 
and his columns reflected Army thinking on any given issue. 
The belief that conflict between Russia and Britain was "in- 
evitable" was common, 3^ and it was little wonder that the mem- 
bers of the CID, and the upper levels of the Army and Navy staffs 
felt that Japanese military aid against the Russians might be 
necessary, even vital, to the maintenance of India.35  In June, 
1905, the Indian government was "believed to be in favor of 
receiving such assistance 1150,000 Japanese soldiers/."3°  In 
July Kitchener submitted a report on the defense of India, not- 
ing that the Army ought to be built up, rail lines pushed to 
the borders, and a system of forts created along the frontier.37 
Lansdowne was unable to pass up such an opportunity to solve 
a part of the Indian problem, and pushed the Japanese on this 
matter as soon as he found them agreeable.  The Cabinet oppo- 
sition was minimal, and, after some haggling over terms and the 
amount of Japanese aid to India, the treaty was signed on 
August 12, 1905.38 
The Russians were annoyed by the renewal of this alliance, 
and, though Japanese negotiations of their own occupied much 
of their time, they did lodge quiet protest in London, and in- 
quire as to the state and nature of the Anglo-Japanese talks. 
Hardinge reported in late May, 1905, that he had told the 
Russian Foreign Minister that Britain "no more contemplated at 
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the present moment the possibility of a Russian attack upon 
India than a French invasion of Great Britain."39 The Rus- 
sians remained irritated as the summer wore on, and in Sep- 
tember Lansdowne had to instruct Hardinge to reassure Lamsdorff, 
the Russian Foreign Minister, of Britain's friendly interests. 
Further, he wrote: 
I earnestly trust that you will be able to 
convince him that it contains nothing to Which 
the Russian Government can reasonably take excep- 
tion.  I do not, of course, mean to say that the 
new Agreement is not, from force of circumstances, 
aimed at Russia more than any other power, but this 
is inevitable>0 
Though the Russians still professed to be hurt by the renew- 
al in October,'4'1 they were willing to talk, and a meeting be- 
tween Hardinge and the Tsar on October 24, proved most use- 
ful, clearing the way for serious talks on the major Central 
Asian problems that confronted the two Powers.  It is interest- 
ing: to note that the upshot of the whole Japanese affair was 
that the British came to feel that they must defend India a- 
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lone in order to save self-respect and face, ' thus nullifying 
the gains of the new alliance, and ending a major source of 
Russian discontent. 
Through the spring and summer of 1905, other factors 
were influencing Anglo-Russian relations, and these other con- 
ditions and events must also be considered.  Germany was 
quite active diplomatically during this time, and the Moroccan 
Crisis and the Bjorko Treaty had no small influence upon 
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Britain and Russia.  Events on the Russian domestic scene in- 
fluenced British opinion of that Power, while events within 
the British Cabinet and bureaucracy also changed the course 
of the relations between the two countries. 
By far the most important of these factors was the pro- 
longed German diplomatic offensive, aimed at breaking the 
Anglo-French understanding and securing an alliance with Russia. 
The Moroccan Crisis was precipitated by the Kaiser's visit to 
Tangiers in March, 1905i at which time he spoke of the need to 
uphold Moroccan independence.  The Germans had caught the 
French off-guard and at a bad time, for Russia was completely 
occupied with losing the Russo-Japanese War.  The British gave 
diplomatic support to the French, but German pressure did not 
subside in the least.  Delcasse was forced to resign in June, 
and his replacement, Rouvier, was known to be more of a Ger- 
manophile.  Even this, however, did not satisfy the Germans. 
Though the entente with Britain was severely strained, it re- 
mained, and Britain, piven the choice of no European ally cr 
France, chose the latter.  As British aims drew closer to those 
of France, the French sought to smooth the way for an Anglo- 
Russian agreement. 
On the other front, the Germans also enjoyed an initial 
victory, followed by the loss of the campaign.  At a pre-ar- 
ranged meeting of the Tsar and the Kaiser at a remote port 
near Viborg, in late July, the Germans came prepared to do 
business, while the Russians came for pleasure>3 Within a 
to 
short time William had induced the Tsar to sign a treaty with 
Germany without the least consultation from Lamsdorff, Witte, 
or the French.  Though the German Foreign Office was not as 
pleased with the treaty as it might have been because of some 
rewording by the Kaiser, the treaty was left to stand. Hardinge 
had noted a change in "Russian sentiment towards Germany" in 
June,^ and though rumors spread that some Russo-German treaty 
had been signed, it appears that no one knew for certain except 
the two parties involved. When Witte and Lamsdorff discovered 
what Nicholas had done, both were appalled, and quickly went 
to work to overthrow the treaty. * This task was accomplished 
with no little difficulty, but by the end of 1905 Russia had 
only her French alliance and a long list of French inquiries. 
With Germany thus eliminated as a possible ally, the Rus- 
sians could turn their attention to the British offers. 
The revolutions and strikes within Russia had bothered 
some British statesmen.  Still, Russia was considered a "rich 
bride" for any Power making an alliance with her, even if her 
"diplomatic currency had become debased and discredited" to 
some extent.^ The uncertainty about Russia's future was 
furthered by rumors of uprisings in Central Asia early in 1906, 
and rebellion in the Navy.  Many British diplomats and foreign 
service employees disliked dealing with an autocratic Power 
to begin with, and looked with even less favor on a nation in 
revolution.  However, the promise of a Duma and other reforms 
met with approval in Britain.  Fears and misgivings were 
k2 
further alleviated when Hardinge reported in September that 
"the military and chauvinistic party" was in shock, and that 
the "liberal and constitutional party" would run things in 
Russia in the future. ' 
This important, if subtle, change in the British attitude 
was accompanied by other, less noticed, but also important 
shifts in policy and practice. The CID decided in March, 1905, 
that Persia could best be preserved by maintaining the status 
quo there, rather than by occupying it.24,8 As fear of Germany 
increased, so the desire to secure Russia as an ally increased, 
and in the eyes of some "It was not a question of getting Rus- 
sia to join England against Germany:  it was solely a question 
of preventing Russia from joining Germany against England." 9 
Further, the anti-Russian Viceroy of India, Curzon, resigned 
in August, ostensibly over a dispute with Kitchener about 
military matters; in reality his independent ideas about Indian 
foreign policy had brought him into conflict with the Cabinet 
on several occasions, and Cabinet pressure was probably behind 
his resignation.  The way was thus cleared for a more amenable 
Indian government that would go along with Cabinet policy.  Thus, 
the Foreign Office, now working against the Germans, set about 
its task with a generally more favorable set of circumstances. 
Balfour's Conservative Government had been struggling 
along for some time in deep political trouble; indeed, the 
Prime Minister had refused to dissolve the Parliament after 
the voting on an Irish bill had gone against him in October. 
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Little effective work could be done on either the domestic or 
the diplomatic scene, and It was no surprise when Balfour re- 
signed In December, calling for new elections. The Conserva- 
tives had done well In the field of foreign affairs, and they 
left Anglo-Busslan relations in good shape. In September 
Hardinge had written that: 
... I have no hesitation in asserting my opinion 
that during the last six months there has been a 
decided improvement In the public sentiment towards 
England, that the bitter hostility [pf the press] 
has almost entirely disappeared, and that the rela- 
tions between the two countries are now on a more 
friendly footing than has been the case since the 
outbreak of the war.50 
With this note of optimism the Conservatives turned the reins 
over to the Liberals, who would continue what their predeces- 
sors had so arduously begun. 
The coming of the Russo-Japanese War caused mixed re- 
actions within British policy making groups.  On the one hand 
a war might humble, or at least exhaust Russia, causing her to 
be more amenable to negotiations about Central Asia. The other 
side of the coin was a European war created by the Par Eastern 
situation.  To counter this threat the British and French 
threshed out their colonial differences, and embarked upon a 
policy of co-operation. The Germans then made a determined ef- 
fort to crack the Entente Cordiale and to make an alliance with 
Uk 
a then weak Russia, hut failed on both counts.  British 
policy had been satisfactory, even to renewing and extend- 
ing the Japanese Alliance, but it had still failed to ap- 
proach Russia successfully.  Talks progressed almost to the 
point of dealing with real issues, only to fall through. 
Each time Anglo-Russian relations began to turn for the bet- 
ter some incident arose to disturb them, and no gains were 
made.  This failure was in part due to the situations created 
by the war, in part the result of the Russians' reluctance 
to talk about Central Asia in meaningful terms, and in part 
because of the division and confusion within the British 
Government. 
This latter factor was a quite important one, for there 
were several schools of thought on the subject, each with in- 
fluential backers.  The solidly anti-Russian faction was led 
by the Simla Government under Curzon, and the India Office. 
They believed that their many years of first-hand experience 
with the Russians in Central Asia had shown them that negotia- 
tions would settle nothing.  Their views were reinforced to 
some extent by the Army and the CID, who still planned and 
trained for a war on the Northwest Frontier.  The majority of 
the Cabinet felt that some settlement must be made, but they 
also felt that Russia held the upper hand, and thus approached 
negotiations with a lukewarm attitude.  Lansdowne and Balfour 
typified this group in many respects, for if the chance arose 
to be tough, they espoused such a course, yet at the same time 
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they feared permanently antaponizing Russia and losing all 
chance of an agreement.  The third, and smallest, group was 
determined to brine- about a Russian entente, and worked vig- 
orously for it.  Sir Charles Hardinge, the King, and a grow- 
ing number of Foreign Office officials were in this group, 
and, considering that in many instances Hardinge worked almost 
alone, the results of their actions were gratifying.  In view 
of this division it is little wonder that British policy was 
so inconsistent. 
The German actions of the summer of 1905 had united the 
British and French, and also had convinced many British states- 
men of the necessity of a Russian understanding.  As the Ger- 
man threat became more blatant, Lansdowne shifted to the pro- 
Russian group.  The CID still saw a threat to India, but placed 
it in a somewhat lower priority group after the Tangiers inci- 
dent.  Reform in Russia itself calmed some suspicious minds, 
while Curzon's departure from Simla eased the situation in 
India.  Thus, by November, 1905, Anglo-Russian relations were 
well on the way to mending, and it appeared that real negotia- 
tions were in the offing after Hardinge's interview with the 
Tsar on October 2^th.  It was, unfortunately, at this point 
that the Conservative Government had to resign, and after the 
elections, a Liberal administration took over the talks. 
Though the Liberals were perhaps less interested in foreign 
affairs than their predecessors, they were determined to bring 
the Russian negotiations to a successful conclusion, and, 
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after some initial delays, worked diligently to do so. 
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IV.  The Making of the Convention 
The Liberal Party that won the election in January, 1906, 
was determined to effect some sort of understanding with 
Russia about Central Asia.  Though the party was divided into 
two wings, the Radicals, who were interested in domestic issues 
and the Imperialists, who were attracted more to foreign affairs, 
this policy of an entente with Russia was favored, or at least 
acquiesced in, by both groups. The Imperialist wing control- 
led the Foreign Office and the War Office, thus giving it good 
control of the foreign policy making groups. Sir Charles 
Hardinge was promoted to the London office from the embassy 
in St. Petersburg, and Sir Arthur Nicolson was moved to the 
latter post, thus placing two able men in key positions to fur- 
ther the goal of a Russian entente. Though the Indian Govern- 
ment still did not favor an agreement with Russia, the India 
Office in London was run by a staunch advocate of a peace- 
ful policy toward Russia, John Morley.  As some degree of calm 
was restored in Russia, Russian diplomats felt better able to 
discuss terms, and the British government, seeing some elements 
of a representative system being implemented, felt better about 
making some type of settlement. Thus, though working out the 
terms would take over a year, the two Powers were ready and 
able to begin serious negotiations in June, 1906, that would 
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culminate in the signing- of the Anglo-Russian Convention. 
The Liberals took command of the British government on 
December 11, 1905, and, after winning the general election in 
January, 1906, formed a Government.  Since October, 1905, the 
Liberals had been debating the formation of a Cabinet, and this 
difficult problem was compounded by the split in the party. 
The "Liberal Imperialists'", headed by Richard Haldane and 
Herbert Asquith, favored a strong foreign policy, while the 
Radicals, led by Henry Campbell-Bannerman and Lloyd George, 
were more interested in domestic reform, taking a rather casu- 
al attitude toward foreign policy.  After some jockeying for 
offices, and an abortive conspiracy to move Campbell-Bannerman 
to the House of Lords, the Liberals divided the Cabinet posts, 
the "Imperialists" taking those concerned with foreign affairs, 
the Radicals taking most of the domestic offices, and Campbell- 
Bannerman becoming the Prime Minister.  Had there been any hard 
feelings, the new Cabinet would have gotten off to a most in- 
auspicious start, but things went smoothly as the Radicals be- 
came absorbed in domestic affairs. 
Sir Edward Grey, who took charge of the Foreign Office 
in January, 1906, had held a number of subordinate positions 
in that organization, though in his several years of service 
he had never served abroad.  Many of the Foreign Office career 
men were pleased to have Grey in command, for he was an "Imper- 
ialist", who favored an active foreign policy, and shared 
their anti-German and pro-Russian sentiments.1  Grey had, since 
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the late 1890's, been known for his pro-Russian sympathies, 
though he kept them in check most of the time.2 By 1906, Grey 
felt that peace should be achieved in Central Asia, and that 
an agreement with Russia was the natural compliment 
of an agreement with Prance; it was also the only 
practical alternative to the old policy of drift, 
with its continual complaints, bickerings and dan- 
gerous friction.3 
Thus, in his first meeting with Benckendorff on December 13, 
1905, even before the elections, Grey hoped "that an agree- 
ment might be reached between Great Britain and Russia with 
regard to outstanding questions in which both countries are 
interested," and told the ambassador that Britain would do 
nothing to "make the resumption of negotiations or a settlement 
more difficult later on ,..,"* Grey had then, very early in 
the game, shown his desire for a settlement with Russia. 
The Russians, however, were not in a good position to 
deal with anyone late in 1905 and early in 1906, as Bencken- 
dorff had pointed out to Grey in December.-' Hardinge and the 
Tsar had agreed in October to discuss the Central Asian prob- 
lems area by area when a conference began.  The October strikes, 
and the uprisings and mutinies associated with the Revolution 
of 1905 were no small embanassment to Russian diplomats, and 
even the Tsar had to admit to Hardinge in January, 1906, that 
"it could hardly be expected that this series of outrages would 
ease at once."   Thus, no formal talks were held until June, 
1906, though informal conversations laid the groundwork for 
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later negotiations.' 
It was, perhaps, just as well that no negotiations with 
Russia began early in 1906, for the British found themeslves 
very busy dealing with the Moroccan Conference at Algeciras, 
Spain.  This meeting of the European Powers was the outcome of 
the German diplomatic attack upon the French position in Mo- 
rocco.  Grey began to organize his forces in December, 1905, 
and sensing that this was a test of the entente, worked in 
close co-operation with the French, exploring answers to the 
Q 
German demands.   Talk of a Franco-German war unnerved the 
French to a great extent, causing the French ambassador to ask 
Grey about the possibilities of British military assistance, 
if such a war broke out.  Even as he asked, secret military 
conversations between the French and British Army staffs had 
bee-un on the initiative of the British Army and a small group 
of Germanophobes in Whitehall, and the Anglo-French Entente 
q 
had started to assume a new character.   At the conference 
itself the major debates were over who was to control the 
Moroccan Bank and the police force.  A six week deadlock 
strained the nerves of the participants, but in the end, the 
Germans conceded their claims to the direct control of the bank, 
and opted to run the police force with the aid of the Spanish. 
The entente had withstood the test imposed by the Germans, and 
in the process the British and French had drawn closer together 
in the areas of both military and diplomatic co-operation. 
The accord signed at Algeciras on March 31, 1906, freed the 
5^ 
European Powers from a grave crisis, enabling them to turn 
their attentions to other matters. 
Throughout the period of the Moroccan Crisis, Anglo- 
Russian relations were quite good.  On January 1, 1906, Count 
Witte, then Prime Minister of Russia, proposed that Russia 
reeded the co-operation of a "liberal and commercial power," 
such as Britain, and that he wished, to make a "new departure" 
in negotiations with the hope of making a settlement in a 
"satisfactory treaty."   Hardinge, who had been in London, 
found Witte awaiting his arrival in St. Petersburg, eager 
to espouse his idea again.  At this meeting the Count pro- 
nosed that Nicholas and Edward meet to make an agreement, but 
in the face of a cool reception, "the conversation drifted off 
to secondary topics."1   This gentle rebuff did not antagonize 
the Russians though, and at a meeting of Cecil Spring-Rice, 
the secretary of the British embassy in St. Petersburg, and 
Benckendorff late in January, the Russian ambassador stated 
that Lamsdorff, with whom he had just spoken, was most pleased 
with the present state of Anglo-Russian relations.  Lamsdorff 
further hoped that some arrangement could be made, but feared 
that Russia could not be bound to an agreement at that time 
"because of her present state."  Benckendorff continued, not- 
ing that the "atmosphere was now different" in the capital, 
and that if the British would now submit proposals for nego- 
tiation, "there was a fair chance of a negotiation being suc- 
cessfully carried through," though "under present circumstances 
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... no pledge could be made." Spring-Rice commented upon the 
conversation, stating that "Nothing could exceed the friendli- 
ness shown by Count Benckendorff to England."12 From this 
conversation, and Witte's overture, it appeared that the Rus- 
sians very much wanted a British offer, but were uncertain a- 
bout accepting it because of their domestic troubles. 
The Foreign Office was well pleased to find such an at- 
titude on the part of the Russians, for it matched the British 
desire to see Russia return to European politics as a strong 
Power, capable of supporting or making agreements.  Grey 
wrote Spring-Rice in mid-February that he was "impatient to see 
Russia re-established as a factor in European politics" to 
counter rising German power,13 and during the deadlock at Al- 
geciras, he wrote: 
The door is being kept open by us for a rap- 
prochement with Russia; there is at least a pros- 
pect that when Russia is re-established we shall 
find ourselves on good terms with her. An entente 
between Russia, France, and ourselves would be ab- 
solutely secure.l# 
In late March, Benckendorff presented the British Foreign Of- 
fice with copies of a document demonstrating a proposed Anglo- 
Japanese alliance to support Turkey in the event of an attack 
upon that nation's "Asiatic side."  Grey quickly dispelled any 
such idea, noting that someone must have invented this docu- 
ment, and that this was the first time the Russians had given 
him "the opportunity of exposing  [suchj lies."15 The military 
also began to see the benefits of a settlement with Russia. 
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Not only would the threat to India be reduced, but the men- 
ace of German hegemony in Europe might be checked: 
By thus detaching her LRussiaJ from Germany 
we should have her on our side if and when Germany 
reaches the Persian Gulf-a contingency which is far 
less tb be desired than Russia's presence there. 
It would also tend to weaken Germany's military posi- 
tion in Europe, and therefore strengthen our own, as 
well as that of France . ...io 
On March 28, shortly before the Moroccan Conference ended, 
Grey wrote the King's Secretary, Lord Knollys, that 
An entente with Russia is now possible, and it 
is the thing most to be desired in our foreign pol- 
icy.  It will complete and strengthen the entente 
with France and add very much to the comfort and 
strength of our position.17 
The Foreign Office was also impressed with the firmness and 
closeness with which the Russian representatives to the Al- 
geciras Conference supported their French allies.  A growing 
sentiment in favor of an agreement with Russia was evident 
with in the Foreign Office, and the end of the Conference per- 
mitted the reshuffling of personnel and the ordering of ideas 
needed to arrive at such an agreement. 
In the spring of 1906 several changes were made in the 
British Foreign Office, and in the Russian government that were 
to have some influence upon the course of future talks. 
Lansdowne had offered the post of Permanent Under-Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs to Sir Charles Hardinge late in 
1905, but the ambassador to Russia had refused, preferring 
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to be on active service abroad.  When the Liberals came to 
power, the offer was repeated, and this time Hardinge, who 
had worked hard for an Anglo-Russian understanding, accepted 
the position.  Another strong supporter of a pro-Russian policy 
was thus moved to a position of some influence in London.  As 
Permanent Under-Secretary, Hardinge had access to the King, 
general supervision of the execution of foreign policy, and 
served on policy making committees.  Hardinge's replacement in 
St. Petersburg was the able career diplomat, Sir Arthur Nicolson, 
who had served well as the British representative at the Alge- 
ciras Conference.  Nicolson, who undertook the post with 
"considerable misgivings," was, nonetheless, "most anxious to 
see removed all causes of difference between us and Russia."1" 
Thus, a person who was as much interested in obtaining a set- 
tlement as Hardinge had been sent to Russia. 
On the Russian side, the departure of Lamsdorff, and his 
replacement by Izvolsky, created some apprehension on the part 
of the British, though Witte's resignation as Prime Minister 
did allay British fears somewhat.  Count Witte, who, despite 
his offer of January, 1906, was known to be of German sym- 
pathies, and later said he was opposed to a British under- 
standing, 19 was engaged in the knotty problem of domestic 
reform, and had little time for foreign affairs during his 
brief premiership.20  The British looked at him with some 
suspicion,21 and made no comment upon his leaving office in 
April, 1906.  Lamsdorff, who had shown himself most anxious 
58 
to arrive at an understanding with Britain, resigned in May, 
believing that the Duma, which threatened autocratic govern- 
2? ment, would interfere with his control of foreign policy. 
Lamsdorff's replacement, Alexander Izvolsky, was on good terms 
with the German Foreign Office, and his promotion created a 
fear on the part of the British that Russo-German relations 
might take a turn for the better at the expense of Anglo- 
Russian relations.23 Though Izvolsky himself thought that 
"Russia had already felt in no small measure the benefit of 
this [Anglo-French/ entente," and that "it was now clear that 
she [Russia] must herself come nearer to Britain,"24 the 
British remained skeptical of him for some time.2^ Though 
Lamsdorff's departure delayed talks, and Izvolsky was regarded 
with suspicion, Nicolson went to work as soon as he arrived 
in St. Petersburg, and in the first week in June definite pro- 
posals regarding Tibet were exchanged.  The new ambassador to 
Russia expected a long period of negotiation, in part because 
of the difficult nature of the subjects to be dealt with, and 
in oart because of the unsettled conditions in Russia,2" and, 
as will be seen, he was not disappointed. 
By mid-1906 most of the offices and officials in London 
were in favor of a Russian rapprochement.  The King had vacil- 
lated back and forth in his support.  His influence upon the 
formulation of long-range policy was minimal, but his attitudes 
and whims did affect the day to day execution of policy.  In 
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April, 190^, the King had favored a Russian agreement, and 
made friendly gestures to the Russians.  He had, however, op- 
posed a loan to Russia in January, 1906, feeling that one could 
not buy a Russian treaty.2'  Moreover, other rulers watched 
the King, and used his actions to gauge the direction of British 
foreign policy.2^ Thus, the King, though not directly affect- 
ing the formulation of policy, was an element to be considered, 
and at the time negotiations began in earnest, he was amenable 
to them. 
The Cabinet, as mentioned above, was split into two fac- 
tions, and the "Imperialists" had obtained control of several 
of the key foreign policy posts, especially by placing Grey 
in the Foreign Office, and Richard Haldane in the reformed 
War Office.  John Morley, the new Secretary of the India Of- 
fice, was also disposed to a Central Asian settlement, though 
he was associated with the Radicals.  The majority of the 
Radicals, including the Prime Minister, had little interest in 
foreign affairs, and left that topic in the hands of Grey and 
his associates.  Thus it was that shortly before Nicolson 
left for St. Petersburg, the members of the Government most 
concerned about Russia, including Grey, Haldane, and Morley, 
met for dinner with Nicolson to discuss the plans and proposals 
of the future negotiations.29 Nicolson1s appointment to Russia, 
and Hardinge's promotion to London meant that key positions in 
the Foreign Office, as well as in the Cabinet, were occupied 
by those favoring better relations with Russia. 
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Opposition to an understanding with Russia centered 
around the government of India and the military offices in 
London.  Throughout 1906 the Army and the CID continued to 
speculate about the possibility of a war with Russia in India. 
Plans for this possible war were also being drawn up.  Though 
the benefits of a detente with Russia in Central Asia were ap- 
parent, a deep suspicion of Russian intentions colored the 
thinking of both groups, preventing an objective view of the 
situation.  The Government of India, now headed by the Earl of 
Minto, continued its policy of opposing a Russian accord, and 
instead of settlement, proposed an aggressive British policy 
on oil frontiers.  Minto frequently complained that a Russian 
settlement would do no good, and with Kitchner asked for more 
money, troops, guns, and railroads to the frontier.  The Vice- 
roy favored an Indo-Afghan-Persian alliance againsu Russia, and, 
having no faith in Russian diplomats, was loath "to appear in 
any way to support the most infamous tyranny in modern times 
in the shape of the Russian government."30 Opposition as staunch 
and emphatic as this created a tender situation in Whitehall, 
and raised the same problems that Curzon's attitudes had produced 
a year earlier.  It is much to the credit of John Morley and 
the India Office that Minto's quick tongue was curbed. 
John Morley, a well-known Liberal of the first decade of 
the twentieth century, was a man of tact and reason.  Though he 
was a Radical, much interested in domestic reform, he took the 
India Office when the Liberal Government was formed, and, seeing 
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that  Anglo-Russian animosities   could   only endanger  India,   and 
cause more and more military  spending there,   supported  Grey's 
effort  to make a reconciliation.     The   India Office was no easy 
nost   in any event,   and the diplomatic  overtures and discus- 
sions  concerning Central   Asia made   the   job no lighter,   espe- 
cially  considering Simla's  fears  of  Russia.     In this respect 
Morley  saw that his   job  "was  to moderate   these   apprehensions, 
while conveying to our neighbors at   the  Foreign  Office here 
for their information  the  argument   from  the great   Asiatic 
bureau  in India."31     Though he  did favor an entente,  he  also 
realized that his  first   duty was  to   India,   and he was   "not   in 
the least  inclined  to  let the F.O.   decide affairs  that   are 
specially  Indian,   and  on which   India will have  to smart   if  they 
go wrong."32     Thus,   the  Secretary  worked  long  and   hard   to recon- 
cile the  views  of  the Foreign Office  and his  Viceroy,   in order 
to achieve a   settlement   that  would aid  India. 
Morley's efforts   to persuade   the  Viceroy that a Russian 
entente would be  safe and practical   were  unceasing,   and his 
tact   in handling Minto,   as well   as his  advice   regarding the 
Indian situation  "removed mountains   in the way of negotiations" 
according to Grey.33    The Secretary was  critical   of narrow 
thinking  in regard  to the  Indo-Russian   situation,3^ and could 
not   "believe   that  there   is no  alternative  to  the  stupid and 
iernoble   rivalries   that  now constitute what is  called our Cen- 
tral   Asian System."35     Despite  Minto's  protestations  that more 
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funds were  needed  for   Indian defense,   and despite the Viceroy's 
continued objections   to a Russian accord,   Morley remained firm 
in backing Grey and the Foreign Office.     As Lansdowne and Balfour 
had reprimanded  Curzon,   so Morley wrote Minto stating that   "You 
argue as   if   the  policy of entente with  Russia were an open 
question.     This   is   just what   it   is not."     Further,   Morley's 
subcommittee  of  the  CID had examined   the  state  of  Indian de- 
fenses,   and  was  opposed to further  spending for that  purpose. 
Still,   he agreed to  show Minto and Kitchener's  ideas  for a 
bigger military budget   to the  Cabinet,   though  telling Minto 
that the  Cabinet  would   probably not  change   its mind.3°     in 
all   things   Morley treated Minto with  respect,   but  firmly  closed 
him  off when  the  Viceroy's harping became t-oo shrill   and in- 
sistent. 
The  corssnsus   of  the leading figures   involved   in the 
Russian dealings was   that  the Government  of   India could not 
be permitted  to pursue an independent  policy toward Russia 
or Persia and Afghanistan,   and  that  the military advice   that 
Simla was  receiving was not   in  touch with or in keeping with 
the   situation as   it  existed,   for they   insisted upon  preparing 
for war.     A  CID report of mid-July stated that the   Indians 
had  much  to gain from an Anglo-Russian  Convention,   and then 
set  about   knocking down Kitchener's  ideas  for more defense 
spending and urging more up-to-date military thinking.37     The 
complaint   that the   Indian Army was out  of  touch with  the latest 
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developments, was repeated in October, 1906, when Viscount 
Esher, a permanent member of the CID wrote Morley that "The 
T.O. military advisers are never up to date.  It was so in 
1880, and has been ever since."38  Hardinge's comments to 
Nicolson in August, 1906, show that Simla did provide ob- 
stacles : 
We have not yet got the views of the India Office 
on our proposed instructions to you.  We have had the 
views of the Government of India which were quite im- 
possible and to which we have replied.  They will prob- 
ably be overridden by Mr. Morley.  As soon as Grey has 
decided the question of the negotiation we will, if 
necessary press the India Office for a definite state- 
ment of policy ....39 
Grey also wrote the British ambassador, pointing out that 
consultations had delayed the prompt dispatch of new in- 
structions for the talks, remarking that "... the Indian 
Government has to be consulted and it takes a little time 
to lead them to the waters of conciliation and get them to agree 
that they are wholesome."^0  In the end the India Office was 
consulted on Asiatic matters, but the Indian Government was 
not asked to comment at all. *H 
The long-awaited formal negotiations began on June 7, 1906 
with Tibet as the first area of conflict to be discussed.  No 
gains were made, no concrete Russian responses were forthcoming 
to the British proposals, and the talks languished.  The British 
now ready, well prepared, and united in their aims got nowhere 
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in part  because   Izvolsky claimed that time to  study the  sub- 
ject was needed.   6     Events  also worked against   the negotiations. 
A DroDOsed  visit   to  the Baltic ports by   the British fleet   was 
ill-timed,   and  caused  an uproar both  in   the Russian court,   and 
in the House of  Commons.   3     Nicolson,   who did not  think highly 
of  the  Duma,   realized its   importance  to  British public   opinion, 
however,   and was  disappointed  when the  Tsar dissolved  it   on 
July 22. Not  only did  the  dissolution bring an outcry  from 
liberals   in Britain,   but   it marked  renewed unrest   in Russia. 
Henry  Campbell-Bannerman did  nothing to  aid  this   tender situ- 
ation when he  inserted the cry   "La Duma est morte,   Vive la 
Duma"   at  the  end of his   speech to the   Inter-Parliamentary  Union 
on July  23. Russian feelings were hurt by this  outburst,   and 
tempers  aroused by  a press attack on the Tsar early  in August. 
The picture was becoming   increasingly gloomy,   and Nicolson 
noted  in his diary   that   "Two months ago   there was  every hope, 
and now very little.■*•* 
Negotiations   proceeded at a snail's pace  for the remain- 
der of  1906.     The   Tibetan problems were  discussed,   and a ten- 
tative  agreement was  all   but  decided upon by the end of   the 
year.     Pear  that Germany might  claim  some stake   in Persia by 
granting a  loan to   that  country prompted  somewhat  concerted 
action by both Britain and Russia.     The   idea of  a   joint  loan 
was raised by  Izvolsky,^? and  this   issue was used to begin 
the negotiations concerning Persia.     The  partitioning of  Persia, 
opposed by Lansdowne,   was easily accepted by his Liberal   sue- 
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oessor, and discussion soon centered around where to divide 
the territory.^8  Izvolsky was somewhat taken aback by the 
suddenness of this British proposal, and sought more time 
to study the question, and win his colleagues over to it. 9 
The British, now knowing their position on each of the issues, 
were eager to settle the problems, but the Russians, unset- 
tled at home, and in a weak position diplomatically because 
of new Japanese threats, did not wish to be rushed and were 
suspicious of British attempts to move rapidly.-50 
In October, 1906, Izvolsky travelled to Berlin and Paris, 
and though the stop in Paris did not arouse much suspicion in 
Britain, the visits to Berlin created a stir."  Izvolsky admit- 
ted that all he was doing was attempting to prevent another 
Morocco by consulting the Germans,J    but this only partially 
soothed British fears.  November passed quietly, and in Decem- 
ber Grey halted the talks until February, 1907, giving the Rus- 
sians a chance to settle some differences with Japan.  Despite 
the uneasiness created by the October visits, the talks were 
making headway, if slowly, and Nicolson's end of the year report 
was gradually becoming optimistic." 
The resumption of the convention talks in February saw 
no startling change in either the style or the pace of the talks. 
Point by point the issues were discussed, analyzed by each 
party, and compromises and agreements made.  The Government of 
India provided the only real opposition to what transpired in 
St. Petersburg.  In June, Minto wrote an "alarmist" letter to 
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the King and Morley to the effect that the Russian army might 
still attack India over the Himalayas.^ Morley replied that 
such talk was foolish, considering the stage of the Anglo- 
Russian talks, and he further enjoined Minto to stay out of 
all political discussions with Afghanistan and India's other 
neighbors,*- The CID came to the conclusion during the period 
of the forthcoming agreement a Russian attack on India could 
he"ruled out of practical politics,"56 and in a reprint of an 
Aoril, 1905, memorandum, stressed the need to recast the British 
thinking about Central Asia and the defense of India.*'  Despite 
Curzon's declaration that Russia could not be trusted, and the 
statement of Lord Percy, former Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
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for Foreign Affairs,   that   Russia would break her agreement,-0 
Orey and Nicolson both felt  that  the agreement  would be kept, 
59 and would  serve   some useful   purpose.   7    Thus,   Grey and   Nicolson 
pursued the   issues,   resolved the problems as best  they could, 
and  on August   31,   1907,   signed  the   Anglo-Russian Convention. 
The  terms  of the arrangement   were brief  and to the point. 
In essence  Tibet  became a neutral   area,   where neither Russia 
nor Britain was   to  interfere,   and   China's  rights as   suzerain 
were  to be  recognized.     Afghanistan was   recognized as being 
within the British  sphere  of  influence,   and   the  Russians promised 
not   to deal  directly with  that  state,   provided   the British made 
no attempt   to change  the  government   of   that nation or annex   it. 
The Northern and Western Frontier  of   India were   thus  covered 
from the  Khyber Pass  east   to China.     Persia was divided   into 
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three  zones.     The  British  received the  southeastern  sector, 
thus  covering the western   invasion route  to  India.     The Rus- 
sians  received   the northern sphere of   influence,   which  includ- 
ed   the capital,   while a large  third  sector,   including the Gulf 
of  Persia,   was declared   neutral.     This  colonial   settlement 
was the only written agreement  and  the only visible  result of 
months  of negotiation.     Beyond  the brief  document,   however, 
was  the beginning of a general  understanding between the two 
Powers,   and   the geresis  of a powerful   diplomatic  combination. 
Jt was  in  these  respects that  the Anglo-Russian  Convention was 
important,   for it marked another  step  in the growing   isolation 
and   encirclement  of  Germany that  characterized pre-war diplo- 
macy and  led   to the holocaust of  191^. 
On the  whole  the  Convention was  greeted   favorably  in 
Great Britain and  Russia.     The   Prime  Minister of England,   who 
seldom commented   upon foreign affairs,   noted that  the agreement 
would   "   remove    the danger of  an Asiatic   Avalanche and will 
make things   easier  in Europe,"61   while Morley saw it  as  remov- 
ing the pressure from   India,   enabling defense  spending cuts of 
some magnitude  to be made. The King believed  that   the   Con- 
vention opened  the way to  settling other disputes,   "now that 
the  ice was   so effectually broken."63     Sir Charles  Hardinge, 
who had played no   small   part   in  starting the  talks,   as well as 
directing them from London,   gave credit  to the   King,   seeing the 
accord   "as  the triumph of  King Edward's  policy   ...."6^    Grey, 
too,   was pleased,   feeling that,   given  time,   the  combination 
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of France, Russia, and England would "be able to dominate 
Near Eastern policy."65 Further, the Convention not only 
brought Russia and Britain together; in Grey's eyes it was 
also a good bargain, for "what [Britain] gained strategically 
5s real, while the apparent sacrifices we have made commercially 
are not real."   Thus, though a few in India felt that the 
ap-reement was a "feeble and artificial growth," and Curzon 
considered it "deplorable,"°? the confansus among British 
statesmen was in favor of the Convention.  The Russians, for 
their part, were also pleased with the agreement.  The neutral 
sphere in Persia precluded any thought of an attack upon Rus- 
sia from India, while Russian domination of the Persian capit- 
al might yield future benefits.  Afghanistan and. Tibet were 
not Russia's to lose in any event, so no remorse was felt in 
being excluded from those regions.  Further, Izvolsky felt 
that he had paved the way for further concessions from the 
British, especially in regard to the old Straits question.1 
Thus, in August, 190?, both parties were pleased with the new 
arrangement. 
The years 1906 and 1907 saw the successful conclusion 
of the overtures and talks begun in 1900.  Once the domestic 
scene in Russia became quiet enough to permit serious negotia- 
tions, the Russians carried them through in earnest, though at 
their own pace.  The British, who had long wanted a settlement 
with Russia, closed their own ranks to form one policy, and 
made the necessary arrangements and territorial divisions 
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with the Russian diplomats.  The King, Grey, the Foreign 
Office staff, and John Morley in the India Office worked dili- 
gently to arrive at terms suitable to the interests of both 
Britain and Russia.  British opposition to any type of rap- 
orochement with Russia came from the Indian government and the 
military staff in London.  By January, 1907, even the military 
had been won over to the side favoring a convention, and Minto's 
lone voice of dissent was ignored when it seemed impractical 
or impossible to muzzle it.  Thus, a small group of interested 
and powerful men, working for what they deemed the best inter- 
est of Britain, achieved their goal of an Anglo-Russian Con- 
vention in August, 1907. 
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V.  Conclusion 
In the first decade of the twentieth century British 
diplomats faced a difficult problem, and managed to resolve 
it to some extent without involving themselves in European 
affairs.  The problem in simplest terms, was that there were 
too few British ships and soldiers to defend the Empire and 
Britain according to the standards that the British themselves 
had set.  The logical answer was to come to terms with their 
rivals, and to find allies.  This, of course, entailed in- 
volvement with and possibly support of other European Powers, 
a policy that had not seen full practice since the days of 
Castlereagh and Canning. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was an 
attempt to circumvent this difficulty, and though the alliance 
worked well in the Par East, it became clear that the European 
ramifications could be disastrous if all parties carried out 
their obligations.  In order to settle old colonial differences, 
and prevent the spread of a Par Eastern war between Russia and 
Japan, the British diplomats began negotiations with the French, 
and arrived at an entente in the spring of 1904.  The British 
had thus seemingly secured their position while making a 
limited commitment to, or taking a small interest in the 
Continental Powers.  The difficulty, however, arose as the 
German attitude toward Britain, Prance, and Russia began to 
change. 
The Germans had courted the Russians since the days of 
7^ 
Bismarck,   and had met  with varying degrees of  success.     The 
Franco-Russian rapprochement  of  the  1890's  antagonized German 
diplomats and soldiers,   who could see  an encircled  Germany, 
waging war  on two fronts.     There had never been any great love- 
loss   in Franco-German  relations,   and after 1900  the German 
diplomats were suspicious of Russia,   though  they did not   quit 
attempting  to create  a Russo-Gfirman Alliance.     In the 1890's 
Anglo-German relations were on good,   if   somewhat distant,   terms, 
for the  British had   no real  problems with Germany,   and were 
still  bent   upon pursuing a course of   isolation and independence. 
That   *-.he  1901   China  Agreement   failed caused no rupture between 
the two nations.     It   was  only   in 1903 and 190^-,   as  the British 
became aware   of  the   purpose of   the German   "risk fleet,"   that 
antagonism  grew.     The  German attempt  to crack  the Entente  Cor- 
el iale created   even more Anglo-German friction,   and  prompted 
British military men and diplomats  to  turn their attentions to 
this new,   European problem.     The fear of  Russia becoming Ger- 
many's  ally,   especially after  the German  attempt  to induce 
the Tsar  to   sign and   ratify a  treaty at  Bjorko  in  1905,   con- 
vinced many  British   statesmen of the need   for some  type  of 
understanding with Russia,   lest   she be  lost  to  the Germans.1 
There   is an  element  of continuity  in British  policy  to- 
ward Russia   in the period 1900-1907.     Lord Salisbury had first 
riroposed  the   idea of   an understanding with Russia   in order to 
reduce friction in  Central   Asia,   thus  permitting a cut  in 
military   spending  in   India.     In  the days  of  isolationist 
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sentiment, such a policy found no great favor with either the 
public or the Cabinet.  Russia was not a hirhly developed in- 
dustrial nation by European standards, and, to the dismay of 
British liberals, it was the last major autocratic state in 
Europe in the twentieth century.  Russia had long antagonized 
the British in Central Asia, and threatened British interests 
in the Par East.  Further, many Cabinet members felt that if 
Britain were to seek an understanding with Russia with regard 
to Asian problems, the Russians held all the high cards, and 
the British had no way of securing favorable terms.  Despite 
these protests, Salisbury made a few overtures to Russian 
diplomats, though they came to nothing. 
Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary in Balfour's Cab- 
inet, took over the idea of an Anglo-Russian settlement, and 
pursued it more vigorously than his predecessor.  His early 
overtures made no headway, and the creation of the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance in 1902 put a damper on the talks then in 
progress.  The Russians seemed to realize, as Salisbury's 
critics had pointed out, that they were in the commanding posi- 
tion In Asia for the time, and refused to seriously consider 
the British proposals, while pursuing a vigorous offensive 
policy in China and Korea.  The coming of the Russo-Japanese 
War in 1905 ended talks for a time, as the Russians felt that 
the British were working against them.  When the war failed to 
PO as the Russians had hoped, the British diplomats again 
brought up the idea of an Anglo-Russian understanding about 
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Central Asia.  Though the Russians appeared interested, they 
were too weak at home and too busy making peace with Japan 
to begin serious talks.  Indeed, it was not until after the 
Algeciras Conference that Russia was prepared to enter into 
negotiations, and even then it took a full year to work out 
the terms. 
The number of British statesmen favoring an Anglo- 
Russian entente had grown considerably from Lansdowne's early 
days as Foreign Secretary.  The rise of a potent and aggressive 
Germany had made the image of an aggressive Russia look rather 
pale, especially after it was apparent that the Russians were 
not doing well against the Japanese.  The rise of the German 
Navy brought calls for more spending to build British war- 
ships, which meant that fewer funds would be available for 
the Army.  This in turn meant that Indian defenses would be 
stretched even thinner.  Though the unrest in Russia after 
1905 created some doubts about her stability, the creation of 
the Duma in 1.906 made Russia much more respectable in the eyes 
of many British liberals, while the weakened Russian position 
in Asia /rave the British a better position from which to ne- 
fotiate.  Further, the abortive German attempts to secure an 
alliance with Russia only prompted British diplomats to work 
harder to keep Russia from coming under German influence. Thus, 
in the period 1904-1907, the number and caliber of arguments 
in favor of an Anglo-Russian agreement grew, and won an in- 
creasing number of supporters. 
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The Ang]o-Russian Convention of 1907 was the work of a 
few men, as far as British policymaking was concerned.  Salis- 
bury was alone in proposing the idea in the late lBQO's, and 
his successors in the Conservative Party followed his lead as 
circumstances permitted.  Lansdowne and Balfour both at var- 
ious times favored the idea of an understanding with Russia, 
but their support flagged in times of difficulty.  Lansdowne 
was perhaps more firmly committed to the idea than Balfour, 
though he was unable to make any significant progress in the 
negotiation of a treaty.  Despite the problems raised by the 
Russo-Jaoanese War, the Younghusband Mission, and the Dogger 
Bank Incident, Lansdowne managed to keep Anglo-Russian relations 
on an even keel, while laying the groundwork for later talks. 
When the Conservative Government resigned in December, 1905, 
the way was still open for an agreement.  The Liberal Imperial- 
ists who directed British foreign policy after December, 1905, 
saw the benefits of good relations with Russia, and worked 
vigorously to implement the old Conservative policy.  John 
Morley in the India Office and Edward Grey in the Foreign Office 
both saw advantages for Britain if a Central Asian settlement 
were made, and both encouraged their subordinates to find suit- 
able terms, and to make a settlement with Russia.  Further, 
Grey moved Hardinge, the former ambassador to Russia, to an im- 
portant post in London, while dispatching Arthur Nicolson, one 
of Britain's best diplomats of the day, to the post in St. 
Petersburg.  Though it took time and effort to finally make the 
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Convention of 1907, the Liberals were willing to work and wait 
to arrive at mutually agreeable terms, thus culminating the ef- 
forts begun by the Conservatives several years before. 
The Convention of 1907 had both its Asian and European 
aspects, and it is in deciding the relative importance of each 
that controversy about the significance of the Convention arises. 
Certainly it was a boon for the British in India.  Afghanistan 
and Tibet were protected from Russian encroachment, a defensible 
frontier established along the Persian border, the Russians pre- 
vented from reaching the Persian Gulf, and generally potential 
Russian diplomatic and military pressure in Central Asia was 
reduced.  The Russians received northern Persia, which made an 
excellent base for later advances and claims in the south of 
Persia.  As a colonial settlement, which both parties, especial- 
ly the British, professed it to be,2 the Convention was a suc- 
cess, solving, at least for the time, a long outstanding prob- 
lem.  This was important for both Powers, to be sure, but the 
ramifications of the settlement extended to Europe. 
Despite the disclaimers from Grey and Nicolson to the 
effect that the Convention was a settlement of colonial prob- 
lems, having no anti-German bias, intended only to distract 
Russia from German overtures, the Convention did have its effects 
upon European diplomacy.  As R.W, Seton-Watson pointed ouc, the 
Convention "may be said to have altered the whole focus of 
Europe, by ridding Britain of all reasonable anxiety on the 
Indian frontier, ... while at the same time it reduced almost 
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to zero the danper of any combination by the Continent against 
Britain ...."3 The threat posed by Germany could be more 
readily met, as men, ships, and, above all, money, could be re- 
leased from India and the eastern Mediterranean for use in 
Europe.  Like the French entente, the Convention was a first 
step toward closer relations, and surely Nicolson, who so glib- 
ly wrote that the British were only attempting to keep the 
Russians from becoming an ally of Germany,^ must have realized 
that in keeping Russia from Germany's side, he was in effect 
adding her to the British side, especially considering the 
Franco-Russian connection that dated from the 1890's.  As was 
pointed out, the press of the day was not so naive as to miss 
the import of the Convention for European affairs, and it is 
doubtful that Grey, Hardinge, and Nicolson missed the signifi- 
cance either.  Indeed, the effect upon European affairs seemed 
to outweigh the merits of the settlement as a purely colonial 
issue. 
It is easy to make too much of an individual incident, 
or to claim too much importance for a single act.  The division 
of Europe into two camps was not accomplished overnight.  The 
British and the Germans attempted to settle their differences 
on other, later occasions, though to no avail.  The Anglo- 
Russian Convention did not immediately usher in a new era of 
neace and harmony between the two nations involved, nor did it 
mark the final division of the Powers into pro- or anti-German 
camps.  The Russians made moves into southern Persia, and the 
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British press showed no great liking for the repression of 
the Dumas in later days.  Perhaps no single act in the period 
1900-191^ was capable of dividing Europe and triggering a war, 
but taken together, they created the situation and the tension 
to do just that.  The settlement of a colonial issue was bound 
to have some effect upon the relations of the Powers in Europe, 
particularly when that colonial issue had been a persistent 
n«e, that the Powers had taken as a constant among a multitude 
of variables in their relations with one another.  British pol- 
icy makers after 1900 could not forsee, or did not try to for- 
see, the consequences of their actions, which were gradually, 
though fundamentally, altering the balance of the European 
situation.  They pursued their new policies in a pragmatic, 
persistent way, and played the game that they had begun to the 
finish.  No one country, nor any one act was responsible in and 
of itself for what happened in 191^; each nation, each event 
had its effects, and it is in this light that the Anglo-Russian 
Convention of 1907 must be viewed. 
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